The First Amendment and Cablevision: Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles by Bolen-Almquist, Jennifer E.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 22 Issue 2 
Winter 1986 
The First Amendment and Cablevision: Preferred 
Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles 
Jennifer E. Bolen-Almquist 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer E. Bolen-Almquist, The First Amendment and Cablevision: Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City 
of Los Angeles, 22 Tulsa L. J. 229 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol22/iss2/5 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CABLEVISION:
PREFERRED COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. CITY
OF LOS ANGELES
The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does
come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disre-
gard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested asser-
tion of authority.*
I. INTRODUCTION**
Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, the right to communi-
cate free of governmental interference, are central to the continued exist-
ence of a free society.1 It is the government's paramount obligation to
protect these rights by remaining neutral toward those who communicate
as well as toward the content of their communication. When the govern-
ment fails to meet this obligation, freedom of speech is denied.
In the context of cable television (CATV), freedom of speech means
the right to communicate in the market-place of ideas without fear of
prior restraint or content-based discrimination. Currently, the right of
CATV operators to exercise free speech is under attack by local cable
franchising authorities. Local franchising provisions2 pose a serious
threat to the free speech rights of cable operators. These provisions au-
thorize franchising authorities3 to limit access to public rights-of-way
and public easements within their jurisdiction,4 regardless of the physical
* Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
** The author would like to thank Professor Judith Finn for her assistance with this Note.
1. G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND, & J. MERCURIO, 'CABLESPEECH' vii (1983) [hereinafter cited
as SHAPIRO].
2. Local franchising provisions often contain a section similar to that of Section 621 of the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, §§ 601, 621, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521, 541 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as the "Act"]; see also infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text discussing the local franchising
provisions of the city of Los Angeles.
3. The term "franchising authority" means "any governmental entity empowered by Federal,
State, or local law to grant a franchise." 47 U.S.C. § 522(9) (1984). An example of a franchising
authority would be a municipality.
4. See 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (1984). "Any franchise shall be construed to authorize the con-
struction of a cable system over public rights-of-way, and through easements, which [are] within the
area to be served by the cable system and which have been dedicated for compatible uses ..." Id. A
cable system is defined as a "facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission paths and associated
1
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ability of these public facilities to accommodate more than one cable
system.
In essence, franchisors are authorized to impose prior restraints in
violation of the United States Constitution. Additionally, local franchis-
ing provisions extend the power of franchising authorities well beyond
the reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions5 allowed to be im-
posed on other forms of speech. As a result, franchisors may not only
limit the number of cable operators who gain access to the market, but
they may also award cable franchises to the operator whom the
franchisor "deems" best suited, using content-based criteria.6 If
franchisors are permitted to continue exclusive franchising practices and
content-based discrimination, freedom of speech will no longer exist for
CATV operators; local franchisors will have successfully suppressed the
first amendment rights of the telecommunications media.
Cable operators claim that local franchising provisions authorizing
franchisors to award "one or more" CATV franchises within a single ju-
risdiction constitute prior restraints upon CATV communications in vio-
lation of the first amendment.7 Cable operators also argue that the use of
prefranchise regulations' results in content-based discrimination, because
franchising authorities are able to disguise selections based on personal
preference by claiming that the choice was made in the "best interest" of
the public. Cable operators, however, feel that they are in a better posi-
tion than franchising authorities to determine the public interest.9 To
protest these alleged infringements of their first amendment rights, cable
operators have sought vindication through the courts.
signal generation, reception, and control equipment that is designed to provide cable service which
includes video programming and which is provided to multiple subscribers within a community
.... " Id. § 522(6).
5. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 111-25 and accompanying text discussing content-based franchise regula-
tions and how the regulations interfere with a cable operator's exercise of editorial control and free
speech rights.
7. Cable operations are protected by the first amendment. See Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v.
City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Midwest Video Corp.
v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 988
(1977).
8. Prefranchise regulations are requirements the franchising authorities impose upon potential
franchisees. These regulations purportedly serve as a vehicle for selecting the cable operator "best"
able to meet the interests of the public in receiving the widest possible diversity of information
sources and services. See infra note 24 for a list of prefranchise regulations.
9. Cable operators believe that they can best serve the public's needs because their operations
are subscriber-based. As a result, economics dictate that the cable operators either meet their sub-
scribers' demands or go out of business.
[V/ol. 22:229
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On the other side, franchising authorities maintain that limiting the
number of CATV operators in a given area is necessary to ensure that the
public receives the widest possible diversity of information sources and
services. 10 Franchising authorities also argue that these regulations are
necessary because of the limited capacity of public facilities, which in
turn limits the number of available cable spaces." In addition,
franchisors contend that cable operations must be regulated, because in-
stallation of cable causes substantial disruption of the public domain.' 2
Finally, franchisors believe that the award of a cable franchise results in a
"natural monopoly"' 3 for the cable franchisee, therefore, prefranchise
regulations are necessary to assure that no class of potential residential
cable subscribers is denied cable on the basis of economic status.' 4 Thus,
franchising authorities contend that regulation of cable is justified under
local governmental provisions and state police power privileges, and is
necessary to preserve the public's interest in diversity of information
sources and services.
A thorough statement of the arguments and authorities for both
sides of this controversy can be found in Preferred Communications, Inc.
v. City of Los Angeles.'5
10. The concept of the widest possible diversity of information sources and services is derived
from the goals of the first amendment and the general purposes of the Act. The purposes of the Act
are to:
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable communications; (2) establish franchise
procedures and standards which encourage the growth and development of cable systems
and which assure that cable systems are responsive to the needs and interests of the local
community; (3) establish guidelines for the exercise of [flederal, [s]tate, and local authority
with respect to the regulation of cable systems; (4) assure that cable communications pro-
vide and are encouraged to provide the widest possible diversity of information sources and
services to the public; (5) establish an orderly process for franchise renewal which protects
cable operators against unfair denials of renewal where the operator's past performance
and proposal for future performance meet the standards established by this subchapter;
and (6) promote competition in cable communications and minimize unnecessary regula-
tion that would impose an undue economic burden on cable systems.
47 U.S.C. §§ 521(l)-(6) (1984).
11. This argument has been commonly referred to as one of "physical scarcity." The concept
of physical scarcity was first recognized in the area of broadcast operations in Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text, discussing the
misapplication of the scarcity rationale as applied to cable television operations.
12. Public domain is defined as public utility poles, ducts, streets, and other public facilities
used in the installation of CATV. See infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text, where disruption
of the public domain, an argument alleged in favor of increased governmental regulation of CATV
operations, is discussed.
13. The "natural monopoly" or "economic scarcity" argument arises from exclusive franchis-
ing practices and the franchisor's desire to "best" serve the interests of the public. See, eg., Boulder,
660 F.2d at 1376-79.
14. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (1984).
15. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 106 S.Ct. 2034 (1986).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts of Preferred
Preferred Communications, Inc. (PCI) was organized to operate a
CATV system in the South Central District of the city of Los Angeles.
1 6
In pursuit of cable attachment space, PCI contacted both the Pacific Tel-
ephone and Telegraph Company and the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power and learned that it was required to obtain a franchise
before it could lease public utility poles to install its cable.17 Subse-
quently, PCI petitioned the city for a franchise.1 Upon petition, PCI
learned that the city employed an auction process in making franchise
selections and required all potential cable franchisees to comply with a
variety of preconditions before it would consider their franchise bids.19
Once all acceptable bids were submitted, the city would then select one
cable operator who it deemed would "best" serve each district of the
city.20
PCI refused to participate in the city's selection process, because it
believed the process infringed upon its first amendment rights. 21 As a
result of PCI's refusal to participate in the selection process, the city
turned down PCI's request for a franchise and refused to permit PCI to
operate a CATV system in the South Central District of Los Angeles.22
In response to the city's decision, PCI brought a Section 1983 civil
rights action against the city of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Depart-
ment of Water and Power in the Southern District of California alleging
abridgment of its first amendment rights.23 PCI based its allegations on
the alleged unreasonableness of the city's prefranchise requirements 24
16. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1399-1400.
17. Id. at 1400.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1401.
21. Id. PCI argued that the city's decision to pick the operator it deemed "best" amounted to
content-based discrimination.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1399. The first amendment rights claimed by PCI were the right to free speech and
the right to exercise editorial discretion.
24. Id. at 1400. The pre-franchise requirements as set out in Preferred are as follows:
A potential bidder must pay a $10,000 filing fee and a $500 good faith deposit and
must agree to pay up to an additional $60,000 to reimburse the City for expenses incurred
in holding the auction. It must provide the City with a detailed proposal outlining its
intended operations over the succeeding nine years and must demonstrate to the satisfac-
tion of the City that it has a "sound financial base," that its proposed operations constitute
"sound business plans," and that it has the proper "character qualifications" and "demon-
strated business experience." The City also requires hopeful bidders to agree to pay the
[Vol. 22:229
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and on the alleged unconstitutionality of the city's exclusive franchise
practices.25
At trial, PCI contended that it was a first amendment speaker.26
Further, PCI claimed that it was unconstitutional to prohibit first
amendment speakers from using public facilities designated as forums for
cable communications when the facilities were physically capable of ac-
commodating more than one speaker.27
The city's argument centered on its authority, pursuant to Section
621 of the Act and the California Government Code, to impose
prefranchise regulations.28 According to the city, local franchising provi-
sions allow it to implement prefranchise regulations to achieve three
goals: (1) to control the use of physically limited public facilities;29 (2) to
prevent excessive disruption of public streets and easements from instal-
lation of cables;30 and (3) to assure that the cable operator best serves the
public's interest.31 The city also claimed that it was specifically author-
ized to award "one or more" cable franchises in an area within its con-
trol; thus, its practices were proper.32
B. Procedural History
After the district court dismissed the complaint, PCI appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, requesting rec-
City a percentage of future annual gross revenues and to provide a variety of customer
services, including at least 52 channels of video service and interactive (two way) service.
More significantly, the City exacts a commitment to provide various mandatory access
and leased access channels. Bidders must agree to provide, without compensation, two
channels for use by the City and by other government entities, two channels for use by
educational institutions, and two channels for use by the general public, along with staff
and facilities to aid in programming. Bidders must further agree to provide two leased
access channels as well. An undertaldng to provide portable production facilities and to
permit free use by the city of all poles, towers, ducts, and antennas is also required.
Finally, potential cable operators must agree to leave a variety of business decisions to
the discretion of the City. Pricing and customer relations are left to the City's control.
The operator must form a "cable franchise advisory board," subject to City approval.
Lastly, the City reserves the right to inspect the cable operation upon demand and requires
a waiver of any right to recover for damages or other injury arising from the cable
franchise or its enforcement.
Id. at 1400-01.
25. Id. at 1401.
26. Id. at 1403-04.
27. Id. at 1405-09.
28. Id. at 1400 & n.3; see 47 U.S.C. § 541 (1984); CAL GOV'T CODE § 53066 (West Supp.
1986).
29. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1404.
30. Id. at 1405-06.
31. Id at 1404-05.
32. Id. at 1400 & n.3.
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ognition of its constitutional claims.3 3 On a de novo review of the case,
the Ninth Circuit held that the city could not limit access to public facili-
ties to a single cable operator when those facilities could accommodate
more than one CATV operator.34 The court reasoned that the city's in-
terest in protecting the public domain did not justify auctioning off the
right to operate a cable television system. The court also stated that
PCI's right to exercise editorial discretion outweighed the city's desire to
select the cable operator it deemed "best."'36
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, but on review
announced that it did not have sufficient facts to resolve the first amend-
ment issues.37 However, the Court held that PCI's complaint should not
have been dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim.3 8
Instead, the Supreme Court stated that PCI had presented a colorable
first amendment claim and that a trial court was the proper forum in
which to develop the facts of the case.39
III. THE PREFERRED COMMUNICATIONS DECISION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a unanimous decision, held
that a city may not constitutionally limit access by means of an auction
to a given region, nor to a single CATV operator, when public utility
structures and other public facilities are physically capable of accommo-
dating more than one CATV system.41 The Preferred court analyzed
PCI's intended cable operations and the city's franchising practices in
light of four factors: (1) the differences between the cable and broadcast
medias; (2) the concept of natural monopoly as a justification for govern-
mental regulation; (3) the disruption of public resources as a basis for
governmental regulation; and (4) the public forum doctrine as a check on
33. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1399.
34. Id. at 1411.
35. Id. at 1406 & n.9.
36. Id at 1406-07.
37. 106 S.Ct. 2034 (1986). In City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., the
United States Supreme Court granted PCI certiorari on two issues: (1) Does the first amendment
require a city to allow all who wish to install and operate cable television systems to have access to
the city's utility poles, ducts, and other public properties, to the extent that those facilities have
capacity not presently needed for other municipal purposes? (2) Is Section 621 of the 1984 Cable
Communications Policy Act, which authorizes the city to limit access to public utility poles, ducts,
and other public facilities by granting a franchise to a single cable television operator or to fewer
operators than facilities can physically accommodate, unconstitutional? Id. at 2036-37.
38. Id at 2036.
39. Id. at 2038.
40. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1411. "[C]apable of accommodating more than one cable system"
refers to the available "surplus space" on public utility poles typically used to string cables.
[Vol. 22:229
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governmental control of the communications industry.41 From its analy-
sis of these four factors, the court found that CATV operations were
entitled to greater first amendment freedoms than broadcast operations.
As a result, the court in Preferred held that the city's attempt to restrict
PCI's exercise of its first amendment rights by auctioning off a single
CATV franchise in an area allegedly capable of accommodating more
than one operator was unconstitutional.42
The Preferred court rejected the city's contention that CATV was
more like broadcast, and thus subject to the type of stringent regulation
standards espoused in a previous Supreme Court opinion, Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.4 3 Moreover, the court rejected the city's con-
tention that CATV is subject to physical scarcity because of PCI's allega-
tion that available space on public utility poles existed.' In addition, the
court found CATV existed as a separate medium of communication and,
therefore, should be regulated by standards best suited to that medium,
despite artificial similarities between broadcast and cable operations.4a
Next, the city asserted that a CATV operator, once franchised, en-
joyed a natural monopoly. 46 The Preferred court declined to decide the
issue of whether a natural monopoly would justify application of broad-
cast standards to CATV, because PCI alleged that competition was eco-
nomically feasible in the Los Angeles area.47 However, the court
referred to another Supreme Court decision, Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, and pointed out that the Supreme Court in that case had
rejected application of access regulations to the press merely because eco-
nomic conditions made entry into the newspaper markets difficult.48 In
41. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1403-09. The Preferred court discussed a fifth factor pertaining to
mandatory and leased access channels, and the city's power to restrict access to the cable market.
Id. at 1409. Although the court did not decide the issue of whether the city may validly require
cable operators to "turn over" channels for use by the public, educational institutions, and the gov-
ernment (PEG channels), the court did state that the access requirements posed a serious threat to
the exercise of PCI's editorial discretion rights. The court reasoned that the city's access regulations
provided no adequate alternative for PCI's right to operate a CATV system. Id. at 1410. For infor-
mation on mandatory and leased access requirements see 47 U.S.C. §§ 532-533 (1984).
42. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1411.
43. Id. at 1403; see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
44. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1404. The court was required to take PCI's allegations as true in
reviewing the district court's dismissal of PCI's complaint. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957).
45. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1403. See also infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text discussing
the Preferred court's failure to distinguish completely between cable and broadcast, and to include
standards exclusively applicable to cable.
46. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1404. The Preferred court failed to discuss the factors creating eco-
nomic scarcity.
47. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1404.
48. Id. at 1404 (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)).
19861
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essence, the mere fact that economic conditions make entry into the print
or cable communications market difficult does not give government the
authority to impose a limited right of access to the press or CATV.
The Preferred court subsequently examined the city's contention
that the natural monopoly characteristics of CATV were related to dis-
ruption of the public domain, and therefore, permitted a greater degree
of regulation.4 9 The court pointed out that several cases have concluded
that cable's alleged natural monopoly characteristics justify some degree
of regulation.5 0 Although the court in Preferred recognized that a cable
company disrupts the public domain when installing cable and maintain-
ing CATV operations, it refused to find that the city's interest in protect-
ing the public domain justified the city's effort to auction off the right to
operate a CATV system." Ironically, the court noted that the city's ex-
clusive franchise practices contributed to the natural monopoly of which
it complained.52 Consequently, the city's legitimate state interest in pro-
tecting public facilities from substantial disruption extended only to regu-
lations which reached the non-communicative aspects of speech.5 3
Accordingly, the court in Preferred found that the city's means, an auc-
tion process, left the city open to claims of discrimination and prior re-
straint of the first amendment rights of bidding CATV operators.54
A. Definition of Cable Television
Cable television developed as the result of community response to
deficiencies in television broadcast services in rural areas.55 Early CATV
systems were used to retransmit distant television signals into the homes
of cable subscribers.56 Cable operators retransmitted these distant sig-
nals by strategically placing antennas in elevated areas.57 Once antennas
49. Id. at 1405.
50. Id. at 1405. See also Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 985-86 (D.R.I.
1983) (wherein the court held that "economic scarcity" justifies government regulation); Omega
Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-28 (7th Cir. 1982) (the court found
that interference with the use of telephone poles and underground ducts permits government regula-
tion of cable operators); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1379
(10th Cir. 1981) (the circumstances surrounding cable broadcasting permit government regulation).
51. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1404-06.
52. Id at 1405.
53. Id. The phrase "noncommunicative aspects of speech," generally refers to non-content ele-
ments, those which the government may reasonably regulate.
54. Id. at 1409. An auction process is generally used to select the cable operator the franchisor
deems "best." Content-based discrimination occurs when the franchisor selects the franchisee on the
basis of programming offered and not on the basis of available utility space.
55. M. HAMBURG, ALL ABoUT CABLE § 1.02 (rev. ed. 1981).
56. See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 1.
57. Id.
[Vol. 22:229
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were in place, CATV systems received the signals of television broadcast-
ing stations, transmitted them to a "head-end" site,58 and ultimately dis-
tributed them by wire, coaxial cable, or optic fiber into the homes of
subscribers.5 9 Originally, CATV operators did not produce their own
programming, nor recompense broadcasters for the television signals re-
transmitted.' Thus, early CATV systems had relatively few channels,
and functioned in a limited capacity as mere carriers of distant broadcast
signals.
Because of technological innovations, today's CATV systems are
labyrinthine in both structure and function, offering as many as 200
channels on increasingly smaller cables.61 In addition, CATV operators
are no longer mere carriers of broadcast signals. Rather, CATV opera-
tors are programmers, editors, and marketers.62 While continuing to dis-
tribute broadcast signals, CATV operators now decide whether and how
to produce their own programs; choose programming; and package,
price, and market the chosen services.63 As a result, the CATV industry
has changed dramatically since its inception."
58. A head-end site is much like a traffic light, because it controls the flow of distant signals to
subscribers.
59. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 1.
60. CATV Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 141, 315-17 (1972).
61. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2889 (1986).
62. See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 3.
63. Id.
64. In the United States, regulation of cable is divided between local franchising authorities and
the FCC. I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 157 (1983). The Communications Act of 1934
grants the FCC the authority to regulate cable. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-234
(1982). The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 grants authority to regulate cable to local
franchising authorites, see supra note 2. Since the onset of cable regulation, there has been a continu-
ing debate between the government and cable operators as to how each medium should be character-
ized. The government argues that the cable industry should be subject to the same regulations as the
broadcast industry. Cable operators, however, believe that the cable industry is more akin to the
press, entitling the cable industry to full first amendment protection.
Congressional oversight during the development of CATV gave rise to many jurisdictional chal-
lenges to the FCC's authority to regulate cable growth. The FCC initially became interested in
CATV in March of 1952, when it presented a memorandum to the Senate Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce. See HAMBURG, supra note 55, at § 1.02. The FCC presented two questions
in its memorandum: (1) whether CATV operations constituted broadcast operations within the
meaning of the 1934 Act; and (2) whether CATV operations should be classified as interstate com-
merce by common carriers. See id. § 1.03. The Senate Committee concluded that the FCC had
jurisdiction only over broadcasters and common carriers and that the FCC could take no action to
regulate CATV services. Id.
Eventually, jurisdictional questions regarding the FCC's authority to regulate CATV growth
culminated in courtroom battles. In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968),
a television broadcast operator sought an order limiting the ability of a television-signal carrier to
retransmit programs from Los Angeles to a San Diego broadcasting station via CATV. Id. at 160.
In its review of Southwestern Cable, the United States Supreme Court examined the functions of
1986]
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Regulation of CATV communications is necessary in order to estab-
lish an effective nationwide network of telecommunications.6" What is
unclear, however, is the proper approach and degree of CATV regulation
necessary to further the public's interest in diversity of information and
the CATV operator's interest in the first amendment. The fundamental
conflict in the area of CATV regulation is whether CATY is more similar
to the broadcast media or to the print media.66 Although the court in
CATV in light of its previous interpretations of the 1934 Act. The Court stated that CATV per-
formed either, or both, of two functions. First, CATV operations supplement broadcast operations
by facilitating the reception of broadcast signals in difficult-to-service areas. Second, CATV systems
transmit distant television broadcast signals to subscribers from outside state boundaries. Id. at 160-
63. Therefore, CATV systems could expand the nationwide system of communications by perform-
ing intrastate and interstate functions, which requires supervision by the FCC. Id. at 168-69.
The Court in Southwestern Cable justified its holding on a broad reading of the language of the
1934 Act. The Court noted that the FCC had regulatory power over all forms of electrical commu-
nication, and "'all interstate... communications by wire or radio,'" including CATV operations.
Id at 173. Moreover, the Court stated that regulation of CATV was "reasonably ancillary" to the
effective performance of the FCC's duties. Id. at 178, 180-81.
A second notable courtroom battle questioning the FCC's regulatory authority over CATV
concerned origination regulations designed to prevent CATV systems from "siphoning" broadcast
signals. In United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972), a CATV operator challenged
the FCC's authority to prescribe regulations requiring CATV systems serving 3,500 or more sub-
scribers to produce local programs and to have available facilities for the production of such pro-
grams. Id. at 654; see also First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C. 2d 201, 223 (1969). The United States
Supreme Court held that the FCC's origination requirements were "'reasonably ancillary'" to the
effective performance of its responsibilities of avoiding adverse effects on broadcast operations and
encouraging CATV operators to follow statutory mandates. Midwest Video, 406 U.S. at 663. The
Court concluded that the FCC's origination requirements served to "'further the achievement of
long established regulatory goals in the field of televisions broadcasting.'" Id at 667-68 (quoting
First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C. 2d 201, 202 (1969)). The Supreme Court's opinions in both
Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video illustrate two concepts of early cable regulatory law. First,
the FCC has expansive jurisdictional authority under the Federal Communications Act of 1934 to
control technological developments in the rapidly changing field of CATV. See Home Box Office,
567 F.2d at 27. Second, and paradoxically, the FCC's authority to regulate CATV is only as expan-
sive as is necessary to achieve its "long established" goals - to implement an effective and cost
efficient national system of communications. Id. at 28. Thus, to a certain extent, the FCC's author-
ity to regulate CATV is limited by its own regulations.
In 1977, the FCC decided to relax its origination requirements and streamline its regulatory
burdens on CATV operators. As a result, diverse state regulatory franchising schemes were imple-
mented. See C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD, & T. CASEY, CABLE TELEVISION LAW: A VIDEO COMMUNI-
CATIONS PRACTIcE GUIDE, STATE AND MUNICIPAL FRANCHISING OF CATV, § 13.09 (1983).
65. See 47 U.S.C. § 521(l)-(6) (1984) (listing the six purposes of the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984); see also supra note 10.
66. The modern era of CATV regulation begins with § 621 of the Cable Communications Pol-
icy Act of 1984. See 47 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. 1986). Section 621 is one of several sections in the Cable
Communications Act designed to establish franchise procedures and standards that encourage
CATV growth and responsiveness to local needs. See, eg., 47 U.S.C. §§ 521, 531-32, 542 (Supp.
1986). Moreover, these sections purportedly assure that CATV communications provide, and are
encouraged to provide, the widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the pub-
lic. Id. § 521(4).
Section 621 and its legislative history are one-sided. Congress provided a franchising authority
with the discretion to determine the number of CATV operators to be authorized to provide service
in a particular geographic area. H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 10, 427-29 (daily
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Preferred failed to take advantage of the opportunity to develop a legal
argument distinguishing cable from broadcast, the public forum doctrine
and the limitations imposed upon governmental regulatory bodies by the
O'Brien standard suggest that CATV is more like the print media. In
essence, CATV is the electronic press.
6 7
B. Fundamental Distinctions: Broadcast-Cable or Cable-Print
The fundamental conflict over regulation of CATV centers on the
functional classification of CATV operations68 and whether CATV is
more similar to the broadcast medium (broadcast-cable) or the print me-
dium (cable-print).
Proponents of stringent governmental regulation of CATV argue
that cable is more like broadcast due to the similar operations within
each industry. For instance, both broadcast and cable operators are
licensees who must secure an operator's license from the controlling au-
thorities before each may set up their respective operations.69 In addi-
tion, advocates of the broadcast-cable model of regulation contend that
cable is subject to economic and physical scarcity,70 much like broadcast.
Economic scarcity, in terms of over-the-air broadcast operations, re-
fers to the ability of a single over-the-air broadcast operator to monopo-
lize spectrum frequencies without regard to the diversity of information
being broadcast. In reponse to problems of economic scarcity, the FCC
promulgated and enforced the "fairness doctrine" which prohibits a sin-
gle broadcast operator from ignoring diversity of public opinion. Simi-
larily, broadcast operations are subject to physical scarcity, because of
the limited nature of the airwaves. As a result, broadcasters are regu-
lated in a manner that seeks to avoid the interference caused by two
ed. Oct. 1, 1984). In so doing, Congress implied that the grant of a franchise by a municipality is
like a license, and therefore a privilege. However, a conflict arises when a municipality grants only
one privilege despite physical room for more than one service. A section 621 franchise is a prerequi-
site to a CATV operator's ability to provide CATV service. 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (Supp. 1986).
Therefore, exclusive franchising conditions obviously limit a cable operator's ability to engage in first
amendment expression. The same is true of prefranchise regulations which often require a cable
operator to bargain away its first amendment rights. Both exclusive franchising practices and pre-
franchise regulations go to the heart of the cable operator's argument that their free speech rights
have fallen victim to the discriminatory practices of franchisors.
67. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 80-89.
68. See Comment, Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke- Toward a Functional First Amendment
Classification of Cable Operators, 70 IOWA L. REv. 525 (1985).
69. Broadcasters are licensed by the FCC, and cable operators are licensed by state or munici-
pal authorities who typically auction CATV franchises to a single CATV operator.
70. See Comment, supra note 68, at 530-35.
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broadcast operators using the same frequency at the same time.71
Advocates of stringent governmental regulation of CATV claim that
CATV is subject to physical scarcity, because public rights-of-way and
utility facilities are limited in the number of cables they can support.
Because public facilities are physically scarce, those advocating the posi-
tion of the broadcast-cable model of regulation contend that exclusive
franchising practices provide an efficient method of regulating the use of
public facilities, while at the same time ensuring that the public's interest
is served.72
Lastly, those desiring to have cable regulated under broadcast stan-
dards argue that the disruption caused to the public domain by installa-
tion of cables and maintenance of cable operations justifies the award of a
single cable franchise, 7 regardless of available cable space on or under
public facilities. The rationale for this position is rooted in the state's
exercise of its police powers to preserve the public rights-of-way for their
normal uses. Proponents argue that the operation of CATV from on or
under public rights-of-way is not a normal use of such facilities. 74
Opponents of government regulation assert that CATV is analogous
to the print media because of a similar capacity to provide a wide variety
of information from varying sources at one time, and because of the simi-
lar exercise of editorial discretion. Although network (over-the-air)
broadcast operators exercise some editorial discretion, both the cable and
the print medias enjoy wider latitude in selecting the programs or articles
to be aired or published .7  Further, those who argue for the print-cable
model of regulation contend that neither economic nor physical scarcity
factors are present in CATV operations.
It is the contention of print-cable model advocates that, although
economic forces make entry into the medium of cable communications
difficult, they are not absolute; they do not justify the auctioning off of an
exclusive cable franchise. Likewise, print-cable advocates contend that
CATV is not subject to forces of physical scarcity because of technologi-
cal innovations which prevent physical interference between cables and
because of the ability of cable operators to offer up to 200 channels of
71. Id.
72. Id. at 535 n.82.
73. Id. at 532 n.83.
74. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 183.
75. See Comment, supra note 68, at 533-34 (discussing the similarities and differences in print
and cable).
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programming on increasingly smaller cables.76
Proponents of the print-cable model of regulation reject the notion
of exclusive franchising based on the inherent disruption to the public
domain generated by the installation and maintenance of cable opera-
tions. Proponents of the print-cable model of regulation also argue that
the use of public rights-of-way by cable operators in the installation and
maintenance of their cable systems is compatible with the normal use of
the facilities, and therefore, are not a legitimate justification for exclusive
franchising practices. Accordingly, when a local government elects to
franchise a single cable operator on the basis of undefinable and uncom-
pelling circumstances, the proponents of the print-cable model contend
that the government is discriminating against and violating the free
speech rights of cable operators.
The broadcast and print approaches to regulation of CATV are de-
rived primarily from the Supreme Court's holdings in two cases: Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC77 and Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo.7s
The Red Lion and Miami Herald cases illustrate the antagonistic ap-
proaches to application of first amendment principles in the communica-
tions industry.
1. The Red Lion or Broadcast Approach
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,79 the United States Supreme
Court upheld the application of the FCC's "fairness doctrine," as applied
to radio broadcasters, because the spectrum frequencies used by radio
broadcasters were physically scarce.80 Generally, the physical scarcity
theory contained within Red Lion is used in current cases challenging the
propriety of governmental regulations limiting the number of CATV sys-
tems in a given area. Using Red Lion, advocates of a broadcast-cable
model of regulation contend that CATV is subject to physical interfer-
76. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 188-89.
77. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
78. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
79. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400-01.
80. Id. at 388-90. See also Comment, supra note 68, at 528-29 (the author discusses the func-
tional debate concerning classification of CATV operations). The fairness doctrine provides that
broadcast licensees may be required to devote a reasonable portion of broadcast time to discussion of
controversial public issues. 395 U.S. at 369, 376-77. The Court in upholding the FCC's fairness
doctrine order as applied to the Red Lion Broadcasting Co., pointed to the fact that broadcasters are
licensees of the airwaves and not owners. Id. at 394. Accordingly, because the airwaves are physi-
cally limited by interference occurring when speakers use the airwaves at the same time, the Court in
Red Lion concluded that the first amendment right of the public to receive information outweighed
the rights of broadcasters to monopolize the airwaves. Id. at 387-90.
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ence, and thus physical scarcity.81 Moreover, Red Lion is used to illus-
trate concern over the monopolistic tendencies of CATV systems. By
analogizing to broadcasting, these advocates assert that the public has a
paramount right to receive information from diverse sources. 82
In Community Communications v. City of Boulder,83 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a cable opera-
tor's claim concerning the geographic districting ordinances of the city of
Boulder, Colorado.84 The cable operator claimed that districting ordi-
nances violated free speech rights because they authorized the award of a
single cable franchise without regard to available cable space or to defina-
ble criteria from which to select the "best" CATV operator.85 In con-
trast, the city of Boulder alleged that "cable systems are natural
monopolies, so that subjecting them to some reasonable regulation
designed to achieve optimal use of the cable broadcasting medium does
not offend the first amendment ... and [that] the districting ordinance
... is a content-neutral regulation .. , "86
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the city of Boulder's
need to ensure that optimum use is made of CATV in the public's best
interest.87 The court went on to analogize CATV operations to broad-
cast operations based on the concepts of physical and economic scar-
city.88 Moreover, the court distinguished cable from print by pointing
out that the installation of cable causes substantial disruption to the pub-
lic domain, whereas the dissemination of newspapers causes minimal dis-
ruption.89 The court also noted that the award of a CATV franchise
81. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 194-95.
82. Application of Red Lion in case law discussing regulation of CATV has its genesis in the
FCC's determination that the fairness doctrine should also govern CATV operations. See Report
and Order, 49 F.C.C. 2d 1090 (1974). The FCC's rationale for imposing the fairness doctrine on
cable operators was grounded in its fear that the growth of cable would destroy local broadcast
programming. See Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968). Therefore, the
FCC claimed it had authority to apply the fairness doctrine to CATV, because such action was
"reasonably ancillary" to the FCC's regulation of the broadcast industry. See supra note 61 discuss-
ing the "reasonably ancillary" standard set out by the Supreme Court in Southwestern Cable; see
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 68. Note, however, the FCC never directly applied the fairness doctrine in
litigation with CATV operators. See 49 F.C.C. 2d at 1109; see also Shapiro, supra note I, at 70.
83. 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981).
84. The term "districting ordinance" refers to the city's practice of limiting the award of CATV
franchises to the cable operator deemed "best" able to meet the needs of the "public". In essence,
the districting ordinances in Boulder are similar to the exclusive franchising practices used by the
city in Preferred; the auction process is the common denominator. See Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1375.
85. Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1372 & n.l.
86. Id. at 1375.
87. Id. at 1379.
88. Id. at 1378-79.
89. Id. at 1377-78.
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meant lengthy commitments by both the cable operator and the city. 0
As a result of these commitments, the court found that the city had a
legitimate economic interest in assuring its public that a CATV fran-
chisee will not become an "outmoded or less than a state-of-the-art" op-
eration.91Accordingly, the court in Boulder held that "the City's
districting ordinances might be justifiable as a means" 92 of preventing
such an occurrence.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Pre-
ferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, rejected the city's
contention, similar to that asserted by the city of Boulder in the Boulder
case,93 that the concepts of physical and economic scarcity, as developed
in Red Lion, applied equally to CATV. 94 Instead, the court in Preferred
pointed out that CATV is a medium of communication different from
broadcast, and therefore, deserves to be regulated by standards designed
specifically for CATV.95 In support of its position, the court noted that
the United States Supreme Court in Red Lion, recognized the need for
applying different first amendment standards to each media, due to
variences in the operational characteristics in each medium.96
In its analysis, the court in Preferred noted that on the issue of phys-
ical scarcity it was obliged to accept PCI's allegations that there was
space available on the city's public utility poles and in its conduits to
accommodate additional cable operations when PCI petitioned the city
for a franchise. 97 However, the court alluded to other cases which had
expressly rejected the notion that physical scarcity is applicable to CATV
90. Id. at 1379. The long commitment refers to the city's interest in awarding a franchise to the
cable operator that will best serve the city over an extended time period and the cable operator's
interest in obtaining the greatest possible return on its investment during that time period. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The means would be justifiable only to the extent that the regulations applied to the
noncommunicative aspects of speech. See infra note 122 discussing the O'Brien standard and its
application to exclusive franchising practices. The court in Boulder expressly applied the Red Lion
physical and economic scarcity rationale. Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1378-80. However, the court cau-
tioned that "the power to regulate [CATV] is not one whit broader than the need that evokes it." Id
at 1379. The court in Boulder further acknowledged that the "full panoply of principles governing
the regulation of wireless broadcasters" did not necessarily apply to CATV. Id.; see contra Black
Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968) (involving the FCC's efforts to regulate
early CATV systems under the guise of physical scarcity).
93. In Preferred, the city maintained that physical and economic scarcity as well as disruption
to the public domain were factors sufficient to justify its efforts to limit access to available facilities
by means of an auction process. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1402.
94. Id. at 1403-04.
95. Id. at 1403.
96. Id. (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386).
97. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (discussing the standard of review of a
complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim).
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operations.98 Though the court in Preferred acknowledged that the ca-
pacity of public utility facilities might in fact be limited it failed to offer
any suggestions to the city as to alternative means of allocating its re-
sources. 99 However, the court did suggest that the auction process used
by the city was not sufficient."°
The court in Preferred declined to decide the issues of whether
CATV is a natural monopoly and of whether economic scarcity justifies
governmental regulation, because PCI alleged that "competition for
cable services was economically feasible in the Los Angeles area."' 0 1 The
court did note, however, that the United States Supreme Court, in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,0 2 rejected a similar argument con-
cerning governmental regulation of the press. 103 Also, the court in Pre-
ferred recognized that several courts have concluded that cable's alleged
natural monopoly characteristics justify some degree of governmental
regulation,"° but refused to accept that a franchising authority may cre-
ate a monopoly via an auction process merely because "cable's disruption
of the public domain gives rise to a need for licensing ....
2. The Miami Herald or Print-Cable Approach
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornilo, 6 the United States
Supreme Court held that,
[a] newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news,
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspa-
per, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of
the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether
98. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1404 (citing Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1054 (8th
Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Omega Satellite Products v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d
119, 127 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[F]requency interference [is] a problem that does not arise with cable
television."); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977) ("[A]n essential precondition of [the broadcast] theory -physical interference and scarcity
requiring an umpiring role for government - is absent.").
99. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1404.
100. Id. at 1406.
101. Id. at 1404.
102. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
103. Id at 257.
104. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir.
198 1) (the court compared government regulation of cable and print based on each medium's respec-
tive degree of disruption to the public domain). The court in Boulder tied disruption of the public
domain with factors of economic scarcity and concluded that governmental regulation best served
the public's interest in preserving the public domain and its interest in receiving the widest possible
diversity of information.
105. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1405; see also infra notes 153-163 and accompanying text discussing
disruption to the public domain as justification for stringent governmental regulation of CATV.
106. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judg-
ment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of
this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.
10 7
Application of the standard set out in Miami Herald to CATV liti-
gation is based on the similarities between the first amendment activities
of newspaper publishers and cable operators.'0 s Although newspapers
are not public forums, and newspaper publishers are not licensees, 10 9
both newspaper and cable operators exercise private editorial discretion
in publication and programming operations. 110
In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,"' the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia cited Miami Herald in support of its
finding that first amendment principles governing regulation of the
broadcast media should not apply to the regulation of CATV." 2 At issue
in Quincy, were FCC must-carry regulations which required CATV op-
erators, upon request and without compensation, to transmit to their
subscribers any over-the-air broadcast signals "'significantly viewed in
the community . . . ." '" The FCC alleged that the must-carry rules
were necessary in order "to assure that the advent of cable technology
[did] not undermine the financial viability of free, community-oriented
television.""' 4 Quincy Cable, on the other hand, asserted that the FCC's
must-carry rules violated its first amendment right to exercise editorial
107. Id. at 258. In Miami Herald, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Florida
"right of reply" statute that required newspapers to print the reply of a political candidate to charges
made by a newspaper regarding the candidate's personal character and official record. Id. at 244.
The newspaper publishing company sought a declaration that the "right of reply" statute was uncon-
stitutional because it regulated the content of a newspaper in violation of the publisher's first amend-
ment right to exercise editorial discretion in publication considerations. Id. at 247; see also U.S.
CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law .... ). In opposition, others advocated an enforce-
able right of access to the press, not unlike the fairness doctrine approved by the United States
Supreme Court in Red Lion. The rationale for a right of access to the press was allegedly to ensure
that the widest possible diversity of information sources and services would reach the public. Miami
Herald, 418 U.S. at 247-48; see also FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973).
108. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1405-06 (9th Cir.
1985).
109. See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 77-81 (discussing the similarities and differences of the cable
and print medias in the context of mandatory access requirements).
110. Id. at 120-22. Broadcast operators exercise editorial control; however, broadcasters are
limited in their ability to broadcast anything by the fairness doctrine and other FCC regulations that
do not affect cable or print.
111. 768 F.2d 1434, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
112. Id
113. Id. at 1437 (citing 47 C.F.R1 §§ 76.57-76.61 (1984)).
114. Id. at 1440. The underlying concern of the FCC centered on the rapidly developing tech-
nology of CATV sytems, and the possibility of the CATV industry driving the broadcast television
services out of business. Id.
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discretion in selecting programming and services to offer its
subscribers.1
15
In response to arguments presented, the court in Quincy refused to
accept the FCC's argument that application of broadcast principles to
CATV was justified, because the "'natural monopoly characteristics' of
cable create economic constraints on competition comparable to the
physical constraints imposed by the limited size of the electromagnetic
spectrum." ' 1 6 Although the court recognized that the installation and
maintenance of CATV disrupts the public domain, justifying some gov-
ernmental regulation, it stated that "purely economic constraints on the
number of voices available in a given community" do not justify unwar-
ranted intrusions into first amendment rights.1 17 In addition, the court
in Quincy pointed out that "[u]nlike ordinary broadcast television, which
transmits the video image over airwaves capable of bearing only a limited
number of signals, cable reaches the home over a coaxial cable with the
technological capacity to carry 200 or more channels.""'  Based on these
distinctions, the court held that CATV was not subject to regulation
under broadcast principles."'
Next, the court in Quincy analyzed the propriety of treating must-
carry rules as incidental burdens on speech.120  The court applied the
standard set out in United States v. O'Brien 2' and determined that the
FCC's must-carry regulations, as applied to CATV, coerced speech. 122
The court found coercion because the rules demanded that a CATV op-
erator carry the signals of local broadcasters regardless of content and
irrespective of whether such programming best suited the operator's sub-
115. Id. at 1447.
116. Id. at 1449-50. The problem with the city's contention that cable television has cornered
the market by operating as a natural monopoly is the fact that many alternative methods of distrib-
uting television signals already exist.
117. Id at 1450 (citing Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 247-56). The idea that economic forces of the
market place alone could justify imposition of prior restraints and content-based discrimination is
foreign to the first amendment.
118. Id. at 1448. The ability of cable to reach a larger number of subscribers than broadcast is
the significant difference between the two medias. Although cable may never dominate the market
as does national broadcast television, the fact that cable systems are competitors in the market place
justifies some governmental regulation.
119. Id at 1449. When the court in Quincy Cable rejected the FCC's physical interference and
scarcity arguments, it was not referring to the physical interference caused by the installation and
maintenance of CATV. Instead, the court rejected the application of broadcast principles to CATV
because broadcast was subject to limited spectrum availability, whereas CATV was not. The court's
failure to discuss in greater depth CATV's disruption to the public domain was apparently because
the issue was one of access to CATV channels rather than access to CATV in general.
120. Id. at 1451.
121. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
122. Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1452.
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scriber-public.123 Using the reasoning that a CATV operator's program-
ming decisions are protected by the first amendment, 124 the court in
Quincy held that the FCC's must-carry rules were not narrowly tailored
to meet substantial interests and were unconstitutional as applied to
CATV.125 Quincy illustrates that economic factors in CATV operations,
making it difficult for some broadcasters to compete in community-
oriented television programming, do not justify application of broadcast
regulations to CATV.
Miami Herald is difficult to apply to CATV exclusively, because
both cable and broadcast operators exercise some degree of editorial dis-
cretion. Yet, when examined in terms of economic scarcity, Miami Her-
ald suggests that market-place constraints on competition alone do not
justify governmental regulation of access to communication mediums. 26
Theoretically, access to either cable or print is inherently available to all.
In actuality, access to both is limited, but perhaps more so to broadcast
than to cable because, in addition to monetary impediments, broadcast is
also affected by the physical limitations of the electromagnetic spec-
trum. 27 In the case of broadcast, where the government has a demon-
strable interest in regulating access to a medium of communication, it
may do so using narrowly-tailored regulations; however, reliance upon
economic scarcity alone does not state the requisite significant interest.12
The court of appeals in Preferred did not discuss Miami Herald in
detail.129 It did, however, note that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, in Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder,30 distinguished Miami Herald in the context of CATV, stating
that exclusive franchise practices were justified because of: (1) the natu-
ral monopoly characteristics of CATV; and (2) because of disruption to
the public domain caused by the installation and maintenance of
CATV.131 Additionally, the court in Preferred, citing Boulder, noted
that newspaper operations have no significant impact on the public do-
main.' 32 However, unlike the Tenth Circuit Court, the court in Preferred
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1462-63.
126. See, eg., Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 248-58.
127. See Shapiro, supra note I, at 188-89.
128. See, eg., Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1404-05.
129. Id. at 1404. Once again the court was bound to take as true PCI's allegation that competi-
tion for cable services was economically feasible in the Los Angeles area. Id.
130. 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981).
131. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1405.
132. Id. at 1406 (citing Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1378).
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refused to sanction the city's exclusive franchising process or to acknowl-
edge the alleged natural monopoly characteristics of CATV.t33
C. Cable Distinguished from Broadcast
Cable television is mistakenly categorized, for purposes of regulation
with the television broadcast media because both are electrical communi-
cation systems requiring the use of a television set for reception, and be-
cause broadcast and cable operators are both licensees who exercise
varying degrees of editorial control for programming purposes. How-
ever, the comparison ends there. CATV is not subject to the phenome-
non of physical interference which impedes broadcast operations, nor to
the physical scarcity of spectrum frequencies inherent in broadcast oper-
ations. 134 Further, CATV operations do not disrupt the public domain
to the extent that a franchising authority should be permitted to create a
natural monopoly through use of exclusive franchising practices.1 35
On the other hand, CATV is much like a newspaper because it "is
limited in channel capacity only by the investment made by the system's
owner and by the sophistication of the technology employed in its devel-
opment."' 136 Therefore, anyone with financial backing and a subscriber
base can set up a CATV operation of any size. 137 An operator may so-
licit the public to lease channel space on the cable much like a publisher
solicits advertisers for its newpaper. 13 " Because of these similarities,
CATV should be subject only to the same regulations as the press.
1. Physical Interference
With broadcast operations, the use of radio and television frequen-
cies must be regulated. If two or more broadcasters in the same area
attempt to use the same frequency, their broadcasts will interfere with
each other, and neither operator will be able to transmit programming. 139
As a result, "[t]he government therefore must determine who may broad-
cast over which frequencies and must tell some applicants that they
133. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1406.
134. See Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 45 (wherein the court held that pay programming rules
designed by the FCC did not apply to cable television because "an essential precondition of that
theory-physical interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring role for government-is absent"
1d).
135. See infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
136. Note, Cable Television and Content Regulation: The FCC, The First Amendment and the
Electronic Newspaper, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 133, 146 (1976); see SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 4.
137. See id at 146.
138. Id
139. See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 194.
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'[cannot] broadcast at all.' ,,4 CATV, however, is not subject to physi-
cal interference. CATV technology allows cable operators to insulate
cables and forego use of the airwaves in order to avoid interfering with
the "cablecasts" of another CATV operator. 4' Physical interference is
nonexistent in cable operations, therefore, the government is not justified
in telling any CATV operator that it may not engage in cable communi-
cations unless a substantial or compelling interest is shown.
2. Physical Scarcity
The notion that spectrum frequencies are scarce in broadcast opera-
tions does not apply to the CATV media. The United States Supreme
Court first applied the physical scarcity rationale to broadcast operations
in Red Lion, stating that "[b]ecause [of] the scarcity of radio frequencies,
the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of
others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium."' 42
However, unlike broadcast, CATV operations are not bound by any spe-
cific channel capacity level.'43 Technological innovations permit CATV
operators to double channel capacity merely by splitting the strands of
each cable into separate channels, increasing the cable operator's ability
to meet the public's demands. Broadcast operators are generally issued
one license covering one channel and are therefore inherently limited in
their programming capacity. CATV, however, does not use the air-
waves; instead, its signals are transmitted from underground cables or
cables strung on utililty poles into the homes of subscribers."
Additionally, there is a facet of the physical scarcity argument
which is concerned not only with the availability of space for cables, but
with the need for cable operators in the market place as well. This argu-
ment addresses the fact that a cable operator's abililty to provide a multi-
tude of channels is of minimal value in an area where there is not room
140. Id. at 195 (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388).
141. See Note, supra note 136, at 134-35.
142. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
143. See Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1448 (wherein the court noted that a single CATV system
has the potential to offer up to 200 channels); Omega Satellite Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d
119, 127 (7th Cir. 1982) (wherein the court stated that frequency interference [is] a problem that
does not arise with [CATV]).
144. Only one circuit has directly applied the concept of physical scarcity to CATV operations.
In Black Hills, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals analogized cable to broadcast and held that
cable did not differ from broadcast because cable merely retransmitted the signals of broadcasting
stations over the airwaves. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968). The Black
Hills analogy is erroneous because today's cable operators originate their own programming in addi-
tion to retransmitting broadcast signals.
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for additional cables or where the local market does not warrant addi-
tional cable companies. In these instances, true economic forces should
operate to preclude additional CATV stations from operating, rather
than a forced monopoly situation created by the exclusive franchising
practices of local authorities. If no public facilities are available for cable
or no demand exists, then physical scarcity factors will operate to limit
the ability of cable operators to provide information to the public. Con-
sequently, physical scarcity, in this sense, justifies some degree of govern-
mental regulation. 145
3. Natural Monopoly
It has been stated that "[t]he primary rationale for government reg-
ulation of [CATV] rates rests upon a premise that [CATV] systems are
'natural monopolies' and will therefore, in the absence of governmental
restraint, exact monopolistic charges from their subscribers."' 46 How-
ever, it appears that CATV operations are not inherently "natural mo-
nopolies," rather, it would seem that the belief of franchising authorities
that a city or town can only successfully support one CATV system has
artificially created a natural monopoly for whomever is granted the
CATV franchise in a particular city or town. Regardless of how these
monopolies originate, there are two flaws associated with the "natural
monopoly" theory of regulation. First, although CATV operators con-
stitute powerful opposition to other forms of telecommunications, CATV
operators are not immune from competiton, and therefore, must offer
competitive subscriber packages. 47 Examples of alternative services are
subscription television (STV), multi-point distribution service (MDS),
over-the-air broadcasting (radio and television), satellite master antenna
television systems (SMATV), microwave master antenna systems, and
each such alternative service competes in the telecommunications mar-
ket.'48 Second, the argument that economic forces of the market place
preclude the operation of more than one CATV operator in a given area
is flawed.' 49 This argument rests on the assumption that the costs of
organization and installation of a CATV system outweigh the costs of
serving cable subscribers, thereby dictating the use of exclusive franchis-
145. See Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1404 (the city of Los Angeles argued that physical scarcity ap-
plied to CATV because space on public utility poles was not inherently available to all).
146. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 154.
147. Id.
148. See S. Rep. No. 98-67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1983).
149. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 188-89.
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hig to reduce subscriber costs. 5 ' As mentioned earlier, the United
States Supreme Court, in Miami Herald,' rejected the argument "that
purely economic constraints on the number of voices available in a given
community justify otherwise unwarranted intrusions into First Amend-
ment rights."' 152 Arguably, the economic forces of the market place
alone do not justify exclusive franchising practices or intrusion into the
editorial discretion of those engaged in cable communications.
4. Disruption to the Public Domain
Installation of CATV systems necessarily involves disruption of
public streets and utility structures.' 53 Accordingly, the rights of CATV
operators to use public rights-of-way, like streets and utility structures,
may be subject to reasonable regulations designed to protect the public
domain from overuse and to protect its aesthetic qualities.154 Albeit,
these regulations must be directed at the noncommunicative aspects of
speech.' 55  The basic test for determining whether government regula-
tions are reasonable, that is, directed at noncommunicative aspects of
speech is found in Grayned v. City of Rockford. 56 In Grayned, the Court
stated: "[t]he nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dic-
tate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reason-
able.' "'"" According to the Court, "[t]he crucial question is whether the
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity
of a particular place at a particular time."' 58 In the context of CATV,
"the question is whether the presence of wires the cable operator seeks to
install on public rights of way would be 'basically incompatible with the
150. Id. at 188.
151. See generally, Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 247-56.
152. Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1450 (construing Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241, 247-56 (1974)).
The fact that Miami Herald concerned newspaper operations is irrelevant here because courts have
stated that "there is no meaningful 'distinction between cable television and newspapers on this
point.'" Id at 1450 (citing Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 46). If natural monopolies exist in the
CATV industry, they are the direct result of exclusive franchising practices. State and local authori-
ties are empowered to ensure that CATV operators obtain a franchise prior to serving the commu-
nity. See 47 U.S.C. § 541 (1982). Because of their power to franchise, state and local authorities
seldom award more than one CATV franchise in any given jurisdiction. See SHAPIRO, supra note 1,
at 11. Clearly the cable operator awarded the single franchise enjoys a monopoly that is not created
by economic factors, but fabricated by franchising authorites themselves.
153. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1405-06. Cable operators must use the streets and alleys in order to
string and lay their cables.
154. See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 180-81.
155. Id.
156. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
157. Id. at 116.
158. Id.
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normal activity' of the streets, alleys or conduits which the cable operator
proposes to use." 15
9
By way of answering this question, CATV operators must have ac-
cess to public streets and utility structures in order to install cable com-
munications equipment.1" Cities commonly designate "surplus space"
on public utility structures for stringing cables. 6 Thus, it follows that
use of public utility structures by CATV operators for the installation
and maintenance of CATV services is compatible with the normal activ-
ity of such places.
The presence of use compatibility in these circumstances limits the
power of franchising authorities to regulate access to these facilities to
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. In essence, "[o]nce the
local government has taken the least restrictive measures reasonably nec-
essary to prevent cable television wires from interfering with the normal
usage of public property, its regulatory power arising by virtue of a cable
operator's use of property is exhausted." '62
D. The O'Brien Standard
The standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. O'Brien 63 applies to regulation of cable communications
because aspects of speech are involved. In applying the O'Brien standard
the court in Preferred found that,
[a] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the con-
stitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest. 164
Although the standard articulated in O'Brien suggests that a city might
have an important or substantial interest in preventing disruption to the
public domain when its public utility structures can accommodate only
one cable system, O'Brien does not support this contention when there is
room for more than one cable operator. In essence, a city's exclusive
franchising practices fail to meet the O'Brien standard when there is sur-
plus cable space available within a city's jurisdiction.
159. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 181.
160. See Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1406.
161. Id. at 1404.
162. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 184.
163. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968).
164. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1405-06 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PREFERRED DECISION
The decision reached by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, that a
city may not employ an auction process to limit access when utility struc-
tures are physically capable of accommodating more than one opera-
tor, 6 ' illustrates an undesirable means of reaching an appropriate end.
The major weakness of the court's opinion in Preferred is the court's
failure to adequately support its conclusion that CATV is distinct in na-
ture and operation from broadcast. Similarly, the court in Preferred
slighted its discussion of physical scarcity and natural monopoly.' 66 On
the other hand, the court's discussion of the O'Brien standard and the
public forum doctrine was complete167 and helpful in visualizing the
cable operator as a first amendment speaker. In any event, the court in
Preferred made an important decision in the context of CATV
regulation.
A. Cable Distinguished from Broadcast
Application of broadcast standards to CATV was properly refused
by the court in Preferred.168 However, the court failed to point out the
concrete distinctions between cable and broadcast. For example, CATV
does not require the use of airwaves, and therefore, should not be regu-
lated as a unique or scarce medium. 169 Also, CATV is subscriber-
oriented, and cable operators are in business to serve subscriber interests.
Obversely, broadcast operations use airwaves which are inherently lim-
ited in the number of broadcasters they can support at one time. More-
over, broadcast is advertiser-oriented and not dependent on a subscriber
base to stay in business. These omissions were pointed out by the con-
curring Justices in the United States Supreme Court's review of the con-
stitutional issues in Preferred.70 Justice Blackmun, in his concurring
opinion, stated that the Court lacked factual information to determine
"whether the characteristics of cable television make it sufficiently analo-
gous to another medium to warrant application of an already existing
standard [of regulation] or whether those characteristics require a new
analysis."' 71
165. Id. at 1404-05.
166. IM.
167. IdM at 1405-06.
168. Id. at 1403.
169. Id.
170. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2034, 2038 (1986).
171. Id. (Blackmun, H., concurring).
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B. Physical and Ecomonic Scarcity
The Preferred court's discussion of physical and economic principles
does not provide a true distinction between these two medias. Despite
the court's recognition that CATV is not restricted by the physical
properties which limit broadcast, 172 the court failed to discuss the fact
that CATV operations are not subject to the physical interference that is
inherent in broadcast operations. The court in Preferred should have de-
veloped a discussion of the technological advances in CATV, such as the
technology that permits cable operators to offer potentially infinite chan-
nel capacity. 173 Moreover, the court should have given some attention to
the other side of the physical scarcity argument, that public utility facili-
ties and the demand for CATV in the market place may be physically
scarce. Similarily, the court should have developed its discussion of the
natural monopoly argument by pointing out the competition cable opera-
tors are faced with in today's communications market. Also, the court
merely alluded to the idea that the city actually creates the monopoly of
which it complains.'7 Notably, however, the court discussed CATV's
disruption to the public domain and the city's contention that an auction
process was a permissible governmental response to the burden imposed
by CATV operations on the public domain.175
In Preferred, the court balanced PCI's interest in gaining access to
public utility structures against the city's interest in preserving public
resources. 76 The court stated that it was important to evaluate the na-
ture and character of the public property at issue and let the property fix
the conditions under which PCI may have access and the city may regu-
late.'7 7 Applying this balancing test, the court determined that because
the city represented to cable operators that surplus space on public utility
poles could be used to string cable for CATV communications,' 78 PCI's
intended use of the surplus space was consistent with its normal use. 179
Next, the court noted that PCI sufficiently alleged facts supporting its
contention that utility facilities constitute a kind of public forum, the city
was not justified in imposing more than reasonable time, place, and man-
172. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1403-04.
173. Id. at 1404.
174. Id. at 1405.
175. Id at 1405-06.
176. Id. at 1406-07.
177. Id. at 1407.
178. Id. at 1409.
179. Id. at 1407-09 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
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ner restrictions to access public facilities."' 0
In the end, the court in Preferred struck the balance in favor of
PCI.181 The court held that unless the city could demonstrate a compel-
ling government interest in issuing a single cable franchise, the city could
only promulgate reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to pre-
serve its public resources. 8 2
The Preferred court's rationale for limiting the city's ability to ex-
clude CATV operators from public forums was its concern that an auc-
tion process presented an "impermissible risk of covert discrimination
based on the content of or the views expressed in the operator's proposed
programming." 18 3 The court mandated that the city uniformly apply
franchise regulations to potential franchisees, and that such regulations
be narrowly tailored to minimize the burden on the public domain.
18 4
The court held that the city must grant franchises to all those willing to
satisfy the city's reasonable conditions.18 5
C. The Public Forum Doctrine and O'Brien
The court in Preferred correctly applied the O'Brien standard to the
city's auction process, and determined that the auction was not a consti-
tutionally permissible means of regulating the communicative aspects of
speech. 86 By balancing the interests of the city in protecting the public
domain with those of PCI in exercising its editorial rights, 8 7 the court
determined that the city may not choose the cable providers that it will
permit to use the medium via an auction process that reeks of outright
discrimination." 8
In Preferred, the court did not dispute the city's contention that it
180. PCI contended that both the city and the public utility departments held themselves out as
providers of access to public rights-of-way. PCI justified its position by citing CAL. PUB. UTIL.
CODE § 767.5(b) (West Supp. 1984) which specifically designates surplus space for cable use and by
pointing out that the city's franchise process itself illustrates the city's effort to grant "at least some
access to its facilities." Id. at 1409. The Supreme Court, in its review of Preferred Communications,
noted that it needed more information regarding the "surplus space" allegedly existing on the city's
public facilities. Preferred, 106 S.Ct. at 2038. Presumably, if surplus space does exist such that PCI
can operate without causing substantial interference with existing use of the facilities, the city must
grant the franchise and will be limited to imposing time, place, and manner restrictions on the
installation and maintenance of PCI operations.
181. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1411.
182. Id. at 1409-10.
183. Id. at 1409.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1405.06.
187. Id. at 1406-07.
188. Id. at 1406.
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could exercise its police powers to enforce regulations designed to pro-
mote public safety and minimize disruption to the public domain. 189 The
problem with the city's regulations, however, was not that they told a
CATV operator when, where, and how cable operations could be in-
stalled; rather, the city's regulations violated the constitution because
they precluded installation of cable operations altogether to all but a sin-
gle cable operator. The court in Preferred determined that the city's in-
terest in preventing disruption to the public domain did not rise to the
level of an important or substantial governmental interest. In its analysis
of this point the court noted that though the city is deemed to have a
substantial interest in maintaining the integrity of the public domain, the
right of free expression outweighs this interest. In this case, the city's
exclusive franchising practices were related to the suppression of free ex-
pression because, potentially, they might allow the city to discriminate
against cable operators who held views with which the city did not
agree. 190
V. CONCLUSION
Each medium of expression must be "assessed for First Amendment
purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own
problems." '191 The major obstacle courts must overcome concerning the
regulation of CATV is determining what standards-broadcast, print, or
otherwise-should be applied to cable. The absence in CATV of physi-
cal limitations that plague broadcast operations, such as scarcity of the
electromagnetic spectrum and programming capacity, does not mean
that no regulation of CATV is permissible under the first amendment.
Nor does it mean that CATV is more appropriately regulated like the
print media or like the broadcast media.
Government infringes on the free speech rights of cable operators
when it seeks to regulate cable like broadcast. Neither physical nor eco-
nomic scarcity arguments justify a compromise of the constitutional val-
ues associated with free speech. Furthermore, disruption to the public
domain, generated by the installation and maintenance of CATV does
not rise to the level of a significant or compelling government interest
sufficient to justify subjecting CATV to stringent broadcast type regula-
tion. The courts must carefully weigh the first amendment interests of
189. Id
190. Id. at 1409.
191. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
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cable operators against the public's interests before upholding regulations
which treat CATV like over-the-air broadcast operations.
It is the cable franchising process itself that intrudes on the first
amendment freedoms of CATV operators. While a government's at-
tempt to regulate the time, place, and manner of cable installation and
maintenance is clearly reasonable, actions taken to restrict access to the
CATV communications medium are blatantly unconstitutional. The
power to grant or deny a CATV franchise based on undefinable criteria
reeks of discrimination, paving the way for a franchisor to substitute its
views for those of the CATV operator.
The model for regulating CATV like the print media is substantially
different than the model for regulating CAT. like the broadcast media.
To regulate CATV like broadcast would be akin to forcing CATV to take
on the limitations of the broadcast industry, while regulating CATV like
a newspaper would be analogous to the laissez-faire attitude embedded in
the political values of our society. However, such an attitude com-
promises the public's interest in determining who provides CATV com-
munications. Essentially, CATV must be regulated by standards just
short of the principles governing the print media.
Jennifer E. Bolen-Almquist
19861
29
Bolen-Almquist: The First Amendment and Cablevision: Preferred Communications, In
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1986
30
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 22 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol22/iss2/5
